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Multilateralism, which prevailed until the global financial crisis and 
survived until the middle of the 2010 decade, has become a chi-
mera. The economic rivalry between the USA and China, which 
focuses on technological competition, cannot be overcome and 
is likely to intensify in the post-pandemic period. This does not 
mean that Europe must accept zero- or negative-sum solutions in 
the new global economic governance. Our paper aims to show 
that the European Union (EU) could play an active role, if it was 
able to reduce its technological gap towards the other two areas 
and to enhance its comparative advantages.  In this respect, the 
triangular game between the USA, China and the EU is defined 
by the interrelationship between the sustainability of the devel-
opment model and technological leadership. Within these coor-
dinates, the EU can offer a ‘focal point’ for international economic 
governance conditional to its capacity to become an ‘attractor’ 
in terms of environmental and social sustainability, to correct its 
distortionary dependence on external demand, and to recover its 
main delays in innovative technologies. In order to achieve such 
complex results, the ‘sine qua non’ condition is that the European 
Union ensures full coherence between its geopolitical aspirations 
and its internal agenda.  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
3STG | Policy Papers Issue | 2021/20 | November 2021
1. INTRODUCTION
Globalisation, a term utilised to understand the trend of unification of international markets, ex-
panded rapidly in the years preceding the global financial crisis (2007-2009), reaching its peak 
around the middle of the 2010 decade. . Despite this trend, globalisation has long since accu-
mulated a large number of significant economic, political-institutional, environmental and so-
cial imbalances. Empirical evidence shows – for example – that information and communication 
technologies (ICT) and, further, digital innovations have stretched and extended the international 
value chains since the beginning of the new century. As evidenced by the ‘real’ aspects of the 
2007-2009 global crisis, this lengthening has weakened the effectiveness and efficiency of or-
ganisational controls on production processes by the firms closest to the final markets or with a 
stronger position in the innovative hubs of given international chains. This element of fragility 
increased during the pandemic shock of early 2020, causing a disruption in supranational pro-
duction processes. Moreover, after the ongoing economic recovery and the recent US initiative 
in the Pacific, major changes in social, environmental, and geopolitical relations will occur. These 
changes will lead to new and further structural difficulties in international economic relations. 
Although during the second quarter of 2021, productive rebounds and the temporary impact 
on prices due to bottlenecks in the supply of intermediate goods and raw materials produced 
new peaks in the nominal value of international trade. The new factors go beyond the economic 
terrain, although they are destined to exert a strong influence on it.
In what follows, we will not enter into such general and complex issues.1 The purpose of the pa-
per is consciously partial, in that it is limited to addressing two economic issues and makes only 
few hints on the possible interrelations of these issues with crucial geopolitical variables. First of 
all, we wonder whether, as the old multilateralism has disappeared without clear indications of a 
new international economic order, the productive system of the EU is in a position to acquire sig-
nificant roles in the difficult international economic transition. Based on the – perhaps optimistic, 
but arguably – positive response to the previous question, we then discuss how to combine the 
resulting external and internal agendas of the EU to pursue this result. It should be stressed that, 
in this perspective, the appropriate implementation of the ‘Next Generation – EU’ (NGEU) and 
its most important programme, the ‘Recovery and Resilience Facility’ (RRF), becomes extremely 
important. 
Our analysis begins with a brief examination of the economic reasons which make the crisis of the 
old multilateralism irreversible, at least in the current decade (see section 2). This crisis leaves an 
immediate negative legacy (see section 3). In addition, it brings to light the growing longer-term 
tensions that will characterise relations between the main international economic areas, here 
reduced to three: USA, China, and the EU (see section 4). Europe has accumulated weaknesses 
and strengths vis-à-vis its two competitors (see section 5). Where the EU and – in particular – its 
most consolidated core, the euro area, were able to mitigate their serious technological lags to-
wards the USA and China by exploiting their elements of comparative advantage (environmental 
transition, welfare state, regulation), this would open up possibilities to build new international 
economic settings (see section 6). A structural aspect of the near future will be a growing conflict 
between the USA and China. The EU could positively influence the economic and social evolu-
tion of these two competing areas, without weakening its membership of the Atlantic Pact (see 
section 7). However, as mentioned above, in order to exploit such an opportunity, European 
international strategies must be based on an effective internal agenda, which in turn must rely 
on the new centralised fiscal policy made possible by the launch of NGEU (see section 8). The 
conclusions summarise our analysis and draw some economic policy implications.
1  Hence, we will neglect important events that are threatening the geopolitical stability. In this respect, no reference will be made – on the Chinese side – to 
events such as the full annexation of Hong-Kong, the violations of the Taiwan airspace, the tensions at the Indian borders, the persecution of minorities; and, on the 
US side, to the immigration policy. Moreover, we will address in a sketchy way more recent events such as the case of Afghanistan or the new military cooperation 
between the USA, UK and Australia (the so-called AUKUS). All these aspects appear incompatible with a balanced multilateralism even in the economic domain. 
However, their analyses are outside the scope of the paper and would require a different expertise by the authors.
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2. THE ECONOMIC END OF THE OLD MULTILATERALISM
The elements of fragility of the international economic order, mentioned above, have meant 
that, even in the years of its greatest expansion, globalisation has been accompanied by a 
search for increasing institutional protection by firms in the major economic areas. This led to 
progressive increases in restrictive measures in international trade, which accelerated after the 
global financial and ‘real’ crises and – in any case – before the crisis of multilateralism (see 
Figure 1). Up to the emerging Chinese leadership on innovative strategic frontiers (particularly, in 
sectors of artificial intelligence) and the advent of Trump Administration, these restrictions were, 
however, compatible with the search for multilateral equilibria for a set of fundamental reasons. 
Figure 1. Total Number of Trade Restrictive Measures in force
In the years preceding the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, China still needed the push from 
international trade to implement its full transition from a traditional economic system (based 
on the accumulation of capital goods and low labour costs, and driven by imitations of goods 
conceived and produced elsewhere and by net exports), to an economic and social organisation 
that can compete thanks to leading positions in innovative frontiers and to the exploitation of 
its (potentially huge) domestic market. From 2009 onwards, the EU and – in particular – the 
euro area increased the dependence of their economic growth on net exports so as to absorb 
the negative gaps between investment and aggregate savings driven by the ageing population 
and the associated allocation of financial wealth.2 The driving force of net exports outside 
European markets also absorbed some of the most negative effects of restrictive fiscal policies 
and temporarily shored up the traditional economic governance framework of the euro area (see 
Esposito and Messori, 2018; Messori, 2021). Thus, the EU’s and euro area’s economic prosperity 
depended on continuous growth in international trade. Finally, the USA, which had to accept 
persistent current account deficits to carry out their role of international consumer of ‘last resort’, 
used globalisation to stimulate investment in the most innovative sectors, to ensure the centrality 
of domestic consumption and to flatten the ‘Phillips curve’ – i.e. to weaken the links between 
high rates of economic growth, lower unemployment rates and wage dynamics.3
2  The accumulation of wealth in the hands of the elderly population helps explain why, in the euro area more than elsewhere, recent economic crises and 
the related increase in economic-institutional uncertainty have led to drastic increases in the incidence of the most liquid components of financial portfolios and 
have slowed the overcoming of the dominant role played by banks (see, for example: Darvas and Schoenmaker, 2017; Kremer and Popov, 2018; and Messori, 2019). 
However, very prudent financial portfolios are not immediately compatible with the financing of productive activities and, in particular, of investments. 
3  Blanchard (2016) was among the first authors to emphasise the flattening of the ‘Phillips curve’. The mismatch between economic growth and the rise 
in medium-low incomes, which has been induced by globalisation and innovation processes and which has been particularly accentuated in the USA since the late 
1980s, has been analysed by various authors. Among others, see Krugman (2008) and Stiglitz (2012).
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As we already noted (see Figure 1), this search for multilateral equilibria had already manifested 
deep cracks at the end of the first decade of the new century. The 2007-2009 global crisis had, in 
fact, highlighted the big difficulties in harmonising, particularly in the USA, consumer sovereignty 
and the compression of households’ income through the artificial construction of an ‘owners’ 
society’ and a financial architecture characterised by very high risks.4 Moreover, subsequent 
internal tensions in the Chinese economy and society revealed the complexity of the transition 
towards a strengthening of the domestic market. By the mid-2010, multilateralism had given way 
to openly conflicting relations. In fact, the accelerated disequilibria in its economy and society 
pushed China to strengthen the centrality of its state-owned firms and hindered its smooth 
transition to a ticker internal market and to the related productive re-organisation. Moreover, 
after the settlement of the new US administration, the Trumpian ideology of America first and 
the associated support to the most traditional components of national production became in 
open contrast with both Chinese evolution and persistent European mercantilism. The resulting 
tensions had undermined the recovery in international trade and made international value chains 
even more fragile.
Figure 2: The US and European economic trends
The fall-back of the euro area into economic stagnation (mid 2018-2019), after a few years of 
recovery from two recessions (2008-2009 and 2011-2013) (see Figure 2), can be – at least in part 
– interpreted as a signal that the conflicting bilateral relations, triggered by the Trump Presidency 
and fuelled by the Chinese economic and technological acceleration, but also by the European 
retreat, had irreversibly broken the old multilateral arrangements. It had become impossible to 
reconcile China’s accelerated transition towards innovative productions with a big technological 
content and the expansion of its internal market, the European model based on effective forms 
of regulation and social protection but also on insufficient domestic demand and the associated 
need to increase net exports, and the US objective of increasing protection of its traditional 
production activities and of defending its (genuine or alleged) supremacy in innovation. 
4  For an analysis of the financial fragilities revealed by the 2007-2009 crisis, see Brunnermeier (2009), and Adrian and Shin (2010).
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3. THE NEGATIVE ECONOMIC LEGACY OF THE END OF MULTILATERALISM
Our argument is, therefore, that the multilateral interactions between the three main economic 
areas had come to a halt even before the pandemic. The growing divergence of interests has 
led each of these areas to raise their barriers to entry through increasing state intervention, and 
to conclude bilateral agreements with third areas and countries to replace the broken trilateral 
cooperation. 
In the debate of the years straddling the pandemic, the argument that this was a reversible 
trend because it was subordinate to the temporary dominance of the Trumpian populism has 
often been put forward. It was argued that, in the post-Trump period, the USA would not have 
an interest in erasing the essential aspects of international economic cooperation with the 
associated risk of undermining its dominant geopolitical role (see Baldwin et al.,2020). However, 
the impact of the pandemic shock is strengthening the framework of “conflict bilateralism” and 
eroding any space for the re-establishment of the old multilateral balance. In addition to this, 
the tragic events in Afghanistan in the summer of 2021 that are set to change the balance of 
power in an area important for geopolitical equilibria, the recent US initiative to equip Australia 
with a stronger military force in an even more crucial area such as the Pacific, and the possible 
threatening moves of China towards Taiwan have shown how complex (i.e., non-mechanistic) the 
link between international relations and economic problems has become. These events show 
that China and the new US administration are ready to intensify their conflicting relations also on 
the economic ground. 
As we have stressed, in this paper we do not intend to analyse the different aspects of globalisation 
or the interrelationships between geopolitical, social, and real economic variables. The previous 
sketchy considerations suffice to indicate that the international fractures in the health and social 
fields, inherited from the pandemic, are set to increase due to geopolitical growing conflicts. 
During 2020 and 2021, the three economic areas failed to restore that minimal cooperation in 
the areas of health, artificial intelligence, telecommunications and logistics that would have been 
required to achieve two results: eradicating COVID-19 by protecting the poorest countries from 
the pandemic crisis and the richest countries from the negative externalities of contagion; and to 
co-manage deficiencies in the coordination of production phases organised on an international 
scale, by minimising supply-chain disruptions. Thus, despite the surprising success achieved 
in the creation of vaccines and the efficiency of the vaccination campaign in most European 
countries and in some states of the USA, today the strong global economic rebound appears 
vulnerable to a new wave of the pandemic originating in weak areas. Moreover, the economic 
recovery achieved first in China, then in the USA, and finally in the EU risks early slowdowns due 
to bottlenecks in the supply of raw materials and semi-finished products and stimulates distortive 
protections within individual areas. 
These distortions are exacerbated by the fact that, by exploiting its rapid exit from the COVID-19 
shock (it was the only large economic system with a positive rate of growth in 2020), China 
has anticipated competing areas with respect to innovative adaptations to the post-pandemic 
which has led to increases in export and, even more so, import flows. The US economic policy 
is trying to recover lost ground through ultra-expansive policies, which could lead to severe 
macroeconomic imbalances. Despite the European innovative and expansionary ‘policy mix’ (see 
Buti and Messori, 2021), a similar risk appears to be less present in the EU and the euro area.
The result is that we are not witnessing a mere intensification of the competition between the 
USA and China, and a European attempt to re-enter in the game. This competition tends to 
turn from a driving force for international growth to a defence tool of domestic economies, 
with the effect of exacerbating the bilateral technological conflict between the USA and China 
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and limiting the EU to an ancillary role. Although different from the previous administration, 
the Biden Presidency does not appear to be geared towards avoiding such a risk. Evidence 
of this has been the discussions at several international meetings held since the beginning of 
2021 (including some in non-economic matters). On those occasions, the USA took positions of 
unilateral closure vis-à-vis China on international strategic issues, and then – with a good deal of 
paternalism – called for the EU support. If our previous sketchy considerations on geopolitical 
issues are correct, this trend may well be strengthened in the coming years.
There would be an opportunity to reverse the inertia and achieve new economic and social 
equilibria by using for this purpose the increased weight of the state in the economy, which 
plays a different role in the USA and the EU. In the post-pandemic period, there is a need for 
substantial public investment and public support for private investment; in addition, there is a 
need to correct those distributional inequalities within advanced economic areas that have been 
one of the worst outcomes of past multilateralism and which have been greatly exacerbated by 
the pandemic.5 In this perspective, the new role of the state in the USA and the EU could also 
become a model for other areas or third countries. Conversely, if it stimulated the promotion of 
‘champions’ in individual areas and thus strengthened the monopolistic positions within each of 
them, this same state intervention would eventually result in an aggravation of bilateral conflicts. 
Effective public intervention must not replace, but regulate and complete the functioning of the 
market in order to overcome its limits, increase overall economic efficiency and mitigate social 
imbalances.
4. THE EU BETWEEN SUSTAINABILITY AND TECHNOLOGICAL DELAYS
Here it would be premature to speculate about the outcomes of the profound changes that the 
Biden Administration is trying to introduce into the US economy and society through public 
transfers in support of low incomes and through massive federal investment programmes. Or 
further to bet on the probability of success for NGEU, which is based on a substantial coordination 
of fiscal interventions with redistributive effects among EU member states. It would be even more 
problematic to assess the domestic and international economic and social effects of the complex 
and countered process of strengthening the Chinese domestic market. However, it is useful to 
compare the recent evolution in the relative position of the USA, China and the EU through 
two approaches: (1) the sustainability of the economic growth models of the three areas which 
is measured – in an aggregated form – by their respective environmental, social and economic 
sustainability; and (2) the relative technological strength of each of these areas. 
In this regard, Figure 3 provides a qualitative assessment of the evolution of the USA, China and 
the EU during three phases of the last 15-year period: the phase of the global financial crisis and 
the related European crises (2007/8-2014),6 the phase immediately preceding the pandemic 
(2015-2019), and the current phase still marked by the impact of the pandemic but also projected 
towards a post-pandemic recovery (from the beginning of 2020 onwards). 
5  Deaton (2013) offered one of the most lucid analyses of the dynamics of inequalities induced by the expansion of international trade. The formidable 
progress in many lagging areas does not, however, remove the strong polarisation in incomes in the USA and – to a lesser extent – in Europe as a result of globalisa-
tion and new technological innovation trajectories (see Bourguignon 2012). For an examination of the impact of COVID-19 on the distribution of income in various 
economic areas, see Darvas (2021) and Ferreira (2021).
6  For simplicity, the threat of deflation, which materialised between the last months of 2013 and the Fall of 2014, is also incorporated in the period of 
European crises.
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Figure 3. USA, CHINA, and EU: their economic repositioning
Source: Own development
In Figure 3, the position of China at the beginning of the global financial crisis is placed at 
the centre of the southwest quadrant. In those years, China’s technological lag relative to the 
USA and the EU was still substantial; moreover, the reduction of pollution and the loosening of 
social control towards workers and the entire population were not significant objectives, so that 
environmental and social sustainability parameters were very negative; finally, strong Chinese 
economic growth was still largely driven by high external surpluses, so that the sustainability 
of the Chinese economic model was also fragile (see section 6 below). During the first phase 
examined here (i.e. the years 2008-2014), China marked a significant progress in technological 
innovations and domestic policies that have been able to close the gap with the EU and to start 
a reduction of reliance on current account surpluses. However, those same Chinese progresses 
have also led to a tendency to erode the margins of US technological supremacy. At that same 
stage, the newly established Obama administration also tried to overcome the legacy of the 
2007-2009 crisis, investing in digital innovations and trying to strengthen social cohesion (see the 
northeast quadrant of Figure 3). The latent conflict between the USA and China, which intensified 
in 2014-2015, also involved the EU. In addition to deteriorating its model of social sustainability7 
and suffering from an insufficient amount of investment (especially innovative investments), the 
EU and, above all, the euro area have increased the dependence of their economic growth on 
increasing current account surpluses (see the southeast quadrant). 
As noted above (see section 2), the conflict between the USA and China escalated and became 
overt during the second phase examined here (2015-2019). Figure 3 succinctly gives an account of 
the reasons for this explicit conflict. The Trump administration’s choices to loosen environmental 
standards, to incentivise the polarisation in income distribution through costly and distortive 
tax reforms, to protect traditional domestic productions without getting major adjustments in 
negative trade imbalances led to a worsening of the US model in terms of both sustainability 
and technological potential. The position of the USA thus regressed to the northwest quadrant 
in a position not too far from the position reached by China in the meantime. Indeed, during 
the same years 2015-2019, China expanded and accelerated its progress in technological 
7  It is sufficient to recall the dramatic suffering of a large part of Greek population and the high social costs of the economic recession in other fragile 
countries of the euro area.
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innovations, reduced positive current account surpluses and began to improve environmental 
sustainability. The result has been that China improved its sustainability model (although not 
compared to its social sustainability).8 However, the positioning of China in the same quadrant 
as the USA accentuated their technological conflicts. At the same time, the EU made progress in 
the ecological transition and started to react to its technological backwardness; however, it paid 
insufficient attention to safeguarding its advanced social equilibria and it increased its current 
account surpluses (see the southeast quadrant of Figure 3). As a result, the EU has been relegated 
to the margins of technological competition, whilst fuelling imbalances in trade between the 
three areas.
The impact of the pandemic and the policy responses that came post-pandemic, signal new 
and important shifts in the positioning of the three areas with respect to the variables on the 
two axes of Figure 3. The radical changes, designed and initiated by the Biden Administration 
in terms of improving economic and social infrastructure and reducing environmental impacts, 
are bringing the USA back to the northeast quadrant by bettering the sustainability parameters 
of the area. Moreover, thanks mainly – but not only – to the launch of the NGEU, the EU itself is 
making substantial progress in terms of digital innovation and is restarting to strengthening its 
social model, undermined by the previous crises but still comparatively strong. The EU is also 
laying the foundations for a strengthening of its leadership on environmental sustainability. The 
result is that, for the first time, the EU tends to approach the northeast quadrant of Figure 3. This 
should not, however, exacerbate the elements of conflict with the USA as the EU’s technological 
lag is bound to remain significant. Moreover, the implementation of NGEU will strengthen the 
European market with positive effects on the rebalancing of the current account of the euro area. 
Conversely, Figure 3 highlights that the fundamental technological conflict between the USA 
and China is likely to intensify. China tends to take dominant positions on growing portions of 
the international frontier of technological innovation. This may improve China’s economic and 
environmental sustainability, but it will certainly worsen its relations with the USA.
5. THE POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES OF THE EU
Figures 4a and 4b provide a more analytical and quantitative confirmation of the conclusions 
reached on the basis of Figure 3. The two new figures present a set of indicators relating to 
the production and utilization of technological innovations in the three areas during the years 
preceding the pandemic.9 In particular, Figure 4a sets out a comparison of five indicators: (i) the 
availability of newly acquired technologies, assuming 2018 as the reference year; (ii) investment 
in the same timeframe in the most innovative technologies (digital, artificial intelligence, internet 
of things, 3D printers, etc.), which are referred to as “emerging technologies”; (iii) expenditure in 
computational software; (iv) applications of international patents; (v) density in the use of robotics. 
Figure 4b focuses on indicators that are related to the most advanced computing technologies 
(quantum computers). The comparison is in terms of: (vi) use of these computational systems of 
excellence, (vii) support provided in this respect by the state, and (viii) expected future revenues. 
Indicator (i) provides a relative measure of the average technological endowment of an area 
but does not focus on its innovative potential; instead, indicators (ii) and (iii) focus on an area’s 
efforts on investment at the frontier of innovation; and indicators (iv), (v) and (vi) assess the results 
obtained from these investments at the current innovative frontier or – as in the case of indicator 
(vi) – projected in the near future. Finally, indicators (vii) and (viii) seek to assess systemic efforts, 
dedicated to future innovations, and their expected performance. 
8  On the contrary, it could be argued that China’s first international progress coincided with backwardness in social protection.
9  Upon request, a methodological note is available specifying the construction methods of each of the indicators used.
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The position of the EU clearly shows its lags behind the USA and China both in digital technology 
and artificial intelligence already during the years preceding the outbreak of the pandemic. While 
it is true that in 2018 the average European technological endowment was – roughly – aligned 
with the US one and outpaced that of the Chinese, the EU lagged behind its two competitors 
(and, in particular, the USA) both in terms of innovative expenditure and – above all – in terms of 
results obtained. 
These negative results were particularly evident with regard to the expected innovative frontiers in 
the near future. In this regard, Chinese dominance (also over the USA) was based on government 
investment much stronger than elsewhere. However, it is perhaps even more significant to note 
the greater weight of public investment in the USA than in the EU. In this perspective, it is 
important that the President of the European Commission reiterated the support at EU level for 
the semiconductor sector in order to overcome the EU’s dependence on Asian production (see 
von der Leyen, 2021). The forthcoming ‘Chips Act’ should work as a driver for other European 
initiatives in the field of digital innovation. Otherwise, the expectations of the EU in relation to 
the yields in 2030 (see Figure 4b above) will prove to be too optimistic even if the NGEU is fully 
successful. 
Figures 4a and 4b emphasise above all the intensity of the Chinese effort, in the years preceding 
the pandemic, to undermine the increasingly narrow dominance of the USA on the frontiers 
of technological innovation. In particular, Figure 4b shows that China has decided to make a 
risky but forward-looking bet by investing substantial financial resources on specific innovative 
trajectories in the field of artificial intelligence; and the USA has been ready to react in order 
to defend its technological leadership. The confirmation of Chinese efforts and US responses 
provides quantitative feedback to the qualitative conclusions reached on the basis of Figure 3: 
the economic contrast between the USA and China depends mainly on technological factors 
that are irreversible over the medium term (the current decade). Both areas in fact aim to affirm 
their supremacy on international markets, basing it above all on present and future innovative 
advantages. As pointed out above (see section 2), this perspective is reinforced by the economic 
and social changes induced by the pandemic and strengthened by the post-pandemic recovery, 
by the controversial geopolitical reconfiguration stemming from the mentioned events and a re-
proposition – albeit in a different and kinder form – of ’America first‘ by the Biden administration.
Figure 4: Technological Leadership
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The conclusions reached attribute a very low probability to the revival of the old multilateral 
economic balance. They do not imply, however, that the only alternative lies in the continuation 
of conflictual bilateralism. Notwithstanding the discontinuities that will characterise the post-
pandemic economic systems in the areas examined here and the persistent centrality of the 
competitive challenge by the USA and China, the costs of this conflictual bilateralism would be 
too high to bear for all the players at stake.  
Even in the new post-pandemic economic scenario there will remain a pervasive interdependence 
between transnational markets and a strong convenience of using international value chains, 
albeit restructured and reformed. The option of managing conflicts through the restoration of 
largely closed economic areas, characterised by the prevalence of relations within each system 
and by strong barriers to external relations, will therefore be dominated by the option of building 
political and institutional structures for globalisation, which may slow it down in order to make it 
manageable (see Antràs 2021). The fact remains that it is not easy to build shared foundations of 
international economic governance that are able to fit into the inevitable technological conflicts 
between the USA and China and create spaces for a more effective integration of international 
markets. It is a matter of preventing these conflicts from leading to self-fulfilling distortive choices 
generating negative externalities and market failures. 
Theoretically, the problem has long been addressed in game theory (see, e.g. Fudenberg and 
Tirole, 1991). The impracticability of returning to the old multilateral equilibria amounts, albeit 
with various approximations, to the analytical difficulty of achieving cooperative results in dynamic 
non-cooperative games; yet this difficulty does not imply that the solution of the game necessarily 
leads to the selection of the worst equilibria induced by tit for tat behaviour, roughly similar 
to the distortive bilateral conflicts established between the USA and China during the Trump 
administration. It is often possible to find a better, second-best solution, which is potentially 
present in the structure of the game but that acts as an actual ‘attractor’ for the behaviour of the 
players only if variables, exogenous to the game, make this solution appealing. Schelling (1960) 
introduced the concept of ‘focal point’ in this regard; and Myerson (1991) provided an analytical 
basis for this concept (see also Kreps and Wilson, 1982). The identification of a ‘focal point’ can 
lead to a positive-sum solution, exceeding the zero- or negative-sum result that is typical of the 
current phase of growing conflict.
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Continuing in the analogy between theoretical solutions and economic policy spaces, our thesis 
becomes the following: in the post-pandemic scenario, the EU could introduce ‘attractors’ to 
identify a ‘focal point’ for new international economic equilibria.
6. THE EU’S GOAL: STRIVING TO ESTABLISH A NEW ‘FOCAL POINT’
To avoid playing an ancillary and largely passive role in the international economic governance 
framework, the EU (and, a fortiori, the other smaller international economic actors) should 
strive to avoid a conflictual bilateralism between the USA and China. The EU has two factors of 
relative strength to avoid this negative result. The first factor is based on the empirical evidence 
presented in Figure 4a: the instrumental endowment available in the EU, which ensures its 
international positioning in advanced technological spaces (e.g. precision mechanics, chemistry 
and pharmaceuticals) even if not at the innovative frontier with respect to digital and artificial 
intelligence. The second factor, which has already emerged in Figure 3, depends on European 
leadership in the environmental economy, regulation, state intervention and welfare state.
Table 1 substantiates the conclusions set out above. It attempts to articulate in quantitative terms 
the sustainability variable (environmental, social and macroeconomic) used on the horizontal axis 
of Figure 3. The comparison covers the three dimensions of sustainability in the USA, China and 
the EU in the years immediately preceding the pandemic shock.10 In particular, the two indicators 
of social sustainability (variation of the Gini coefficient after tax and public benefits and the size 
of social spending) show the absolute predominance and relative effectiveness of European 
welfare. The result is not surprising: beyond the modest attempts made by the Clinton and 
Obama administrations and the announcements of the Biden administration (see also section 
7 below), the welfare state has been – since the post-war period – a European prerogative (see 
Lindert, 2021). Similar predominance emerges from environmental sustainability data on CO2 
emissions both in absolute terms and in terms of impact on GDP or population.
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China -0,3 -0,7 11,0 11,5 0,5 8,1 16,4 1,6 6,0




Calculation Labour productivity per person 




CAB (% of GDP) as provided by 
the source. Average calculated.
Labour productivity
Eurostat for EU-27. Conference 
Board TED for US. National 
Bureau of Statistics for China.
Social expending calculated as Health + Social 
protection spending.
CO2 emission
European Commission, JRC, EDGAR database.
Indicators as provided by the source. EU-28.
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Eurostat, Sustainable Development Indicators, for EU-27. For US and 
CN, data from the International Energy Outlook of the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA).
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27, as provided by the source. For US and CN, the % of renewable 
energy consumption in total energy consumption are calculated.
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The Standardized World Income Inequality Database 
(SWIID), https://fsolt.org/
Difference between Gini coefficient based on market 
income and Gini coefficient based on disposable 
income. For the EU, the average of the 27 MS is first 
calculated for each of the two indicators, then the 
difference is calculated.
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Eurostat for EU-27.  IMF Government Financial 





Difference between Gini coefficient 
before/after tax + benefits
10  In the following, we comment on the European data and we find confirmation of the horizontal position of the EU in Figure 3 at the end of the second 
phase examined there. However, it is easy to verify that the US and Chinese data also justify the relative position of the two areas in the same Figure and with reference 
to the same back of time.
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The only area, where the EU is at a relative disadvantage, is macroeconomic sustainability as 
measured by the large surpluses accumulated in trade with the other areas in recent years. 
As it has been repeatedly stressed, European growth has been largely driven by net exports. 
Far from reflecting high competitiveness, the positive current account imbalances of the EU 
(and, in particular, of the euro area) have been the result of a persistent excess of aggregate 
savings compared to aggregate investment. In other terms, these imbalances have been the 
macroeconomic counterpart of the lack of innovations and the associated implication for future 
economic prospects of the euro area.11 This indicator therefore measures the relative decline 
of the EU and the euro area. It is important to add that geopolitical dependence on external 
demand has made the EU particularly vulnerable to exogenous shocks and economic policy 
decisions beyond its control. These considerations explain, inter alia, why, unlike the prevailing 
vulgata in a number of northern European countries - also endorsed by some economists - 
the persistent current account surplus is regarded here as a crucial element of macroeconomic 
weakness rather than strength.  
The evidence provided in Table 1 supports our statement that the EU could play a driving role 
vis-à-vis the USA and China in order to identify international economic equilibria that overcome 
both the old multilateralism and the new conflictual bilateralism. To this end, the EU needs 
to leverage its advantages over the ‘green’ transition and social inclusion by linking them to 
the (at least partial) recovery of its delays in the adoption of digital technologies. European 
dominance in terms of social inclusion and green transition can, in fact, become an instrument 
for the governance of new international economic relations, which can certainly not eliminate 
the technological conflicts between the USA and China, but can open an interesting perspective 
(attracting towards a ‘focal point’) for the determination of equilibria that are less ‘bad’ than 
those set by a tit for tat bilateralism that would entail a substantial marginalisation of the EU. 
Three reasons underpin our conclusion. 
The first reason is that both the USA and China aim to incorporate in their future economic model 
a progress in the ecological and social fields, albeit with different intensities and purposes. On 
the one hand, the Biden administration is focusing on a greater commitment to environmental 
rebalancing, the introduction of social welfare programmes and the containment of inequalities 
in income distribution in order to build a social safety net able to mitigate the impact of changes 
in technology and production organisation. Therefore, Biden’s re-proposal of a form of “America 
first” is not only less aggressive than Trump administration, but also aims at defining an opposite 
economic-social model;12 in this sense, the USA is becoming “more European” (as evidenced by 
their return to the northeast quadrant of Figure 3). On the other hand, in order to accelerate the 
full affirmation of its technological potential and its internal market and to gain not only economic 
but also political and institutional leadership in the new international context, China needs to 
prove that both the stigma of the world’s largest polluter and that of a distorted competitor based 
on low wages are undeserved. Therefore, the prospects for success of the Chinese authoritarian 
“political capitalism” are also linked to its ability to incorporate greater environmental protection 
and to create a middle-income class in order to avoid more radical forms of openness of US-style 
liberal-meritocratic capitalism (see Milanovic, 2019).
The second reason is that European leadership in the ecological and social fields poses no threat 
to the USA or to China. The EU provides an institutional model of social inclusion and transition 
to sustainable energy sources and sustainable production based on greater complementarity 
between state and market, on more effective regulation of social relations, and on income 
11  Buti and Tomasi (2018) stress that, due to the asymmetric adjustment between member states and the consequent deflationary policies during the 
international financial crisis, the euro area moved away from its previous broadly balanced current account position and started to accumulate the highest and most 
persistent external surpluses of all largest economic areas. The econometric evidence in Esposito and Messori (2018) confirms that this surplus was driven by weak 
rather than strength factors. 
12  As already mentioned, the Trump administration focused on protecting traditional domestic sectors, also in order to create a mésalliance between the 
richest sections of society and workers with outdated qualifications. On the other hand, the Biden administration seems to aim at relaunching internal innovative 
activities and exploiting new skills, albeit within a less unbalanced society.
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redistribution. The resulting European combination of welfare state and circular economy thus 
entails a socially tempered form of liberal capitalism. Given the different aims and radical distances 
between US and Chinese capitalism, these two areas will aim at partial and distant imitations of 
the European model. For the USA, it will be a matter of incorporating those ingredients that 
increase contiguity with the EU in a common form of capitalism (that is, liberal capitalism); for 
China, it will be a matter of selecting ecological and social openings that are instrumental in 
strengthening its model of “political” capitalism. Therefore, while acting as a (partial) attractor for 
both the USA and China, the EU will not be pushed to weaken its international Atlantic vocation. 
The third reason lies in a specific European option. Since its appointment in autumn 2019, 
the new European Commission has clearly set itself the objective of accelerating the green 
transition and strengthening digital innovation processes (see the most recent State of the Union 
speech by the Commission President: von der Leyen, 2021). The European fiscal response to 
the pandemic, centred on NGEU, has put this commitment into practice. Access to the funds 
of the most important NGEU programme, the RRF, presupposes that each EU Member State 
has obtained the approval of a national Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP), in which at least 
37% of EU resources are allocated to ‘green’ transition projects and at least 20% of resources 
to digital projects. In addition, the RRF rests on a third cornerstone: the combination of digital 
technologies and reduction of environmental impact must be made compatible with progress 
in terms of social inclusion. If successful, these synergies would open up international spaces 
for the EU that would not be conflicting with the USA and China and could help limit the 
distorted technological competition between the latter two areas. In order to comply with the 
EU’s ambitious environmental and social objectives, European digital innovations should follow 
different technological trajectories compared to those recently achieved in the USA and China. 
This would bring to the fore an old theme of the Schumpeterian literature (see e.g. Dosi, 1982): 
the most successful imitative processes are not those that follow the path of innovators, but 
those that open connected and complementary trajectories.
7. EUROPE AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
The above considerations indicate that, thanks to the EU’s potential economic mediation role, 
distortive technological conflicts between the USA and China can be made compatible with the 
introduction of other dimensions in international markets. There is scope for partial convergence 
towards the ecological transition and for a rebalancing of income distribution and, under certain 
conditions, for tolerance towards different innovative trajectories. Given the importance that we 
attach to the technological variable, it is worth insisting on the last aspect by taking up again 
the jargon of game theory. In this new framework, the ‘bad’ equilibria resulting from the tit for 
tat bilateral conflicts between the USA and China could be replaced by ‘Stackelberg equilibria’ 
– i.e. equilibria where the two competing areas and the EU would carve out roles of leaders and 
followers depending on the technological trajectories under consideration. 
However, this admittedly optimistic conclusion depends on the success of NGEU and the RRF in 
attaining a positive combination of environmental transition, social inclusion and macroeconomic 
growth. 
In this respect, it should first be noted that many innovations in digital – as well as in artificial 
intelligence, and telecommunications in a broad definition – are not of low environmental impact 
(see OECD, 2019); therefore, the challenge for the EU is to reduce its technological backwardness 
compared to competing areas while respecting the constraint of the ecological transition that 
reduces the innovative trajectories available. Second, innovative changes have significant 
impacts on the composition of labour demand; and, especially in the short to medium term 
and in the European framework of strong market regulation and population ageing, profound 
qualitative shifts in labour demand accelerate the obsolescence of many of the traditional skills 
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and penalise lower skills, giving rise to lower employment rates and higher rates of technological 
unemployment, further polarisations in wages and expansion of poverty groups, including in 
advanced areas.13 The European objective of social inclusion, therefore, calls for innovative active 
labour policies and social policies to combat poverty. Finally, the environmental transition and the 
digital innovation lead to an acceleration in the degree of obsolescence of the existing productive 
capital stock; while this increases investments as well as expected net returns of production 
processes in the long run, it also tends to increase costs and create productive bottlenecks in 
the short to medium term. The combination of divergences between labour demand and supply, 
rising social costs, and the accelerated obsolescence of old capital stock risk leading to supply 
shocks that can have significant short-term negative impacts on economic activity.
The above perspective is starting to be reflected in analyses of the post-pandemic outlook of 
the European economy. Lenaerts et al. (2021) and Pisani-Ferry (2021) argue that green growth 
and the related digital innovations require policy choices that take into account the costs of the 
transition. The macroeconomic impact of the EU’s agreed objective of reducing CO2 emissions 
in 2030 by 55% compared to 1990 level and achieving a substantial zero of these emissions 
by 2050 could be more pronounced than that caused by other major post-war supply shocks 
(e.g. those linked to the raw materials crisis and, in particular, to the oil crisis in the early 1970s). 
Therefore, it is essential that the accelerated obsolescence of large shares of capital stock and 
labour availability does not have negative short-term economic effects in the EU which would 
risk jeopardising both the implementation of the replacement investments required by the green 
transition and the retraining and protection of workers; it would also risk blocking the European 
effort to bridge some of the technological gaps with competing areas.
In order to reduce the costs of the transition and avoid their negative consequences, it is important 
to take into account the main differences between the shock triggered by environmental 
objectives and related digital innovations in the post-pandemic phase, from the previously 
mentioned past supply shocks. The current shock is policy-induced and announced; as such, it is 
‘common knowledge’. Conversely, previous shocks were the consequence of largely unexpected 
phenomena. This means that today, unlike the recent past, the EU and its member states have 
time to prepare to manage the transition effectively (see European Commission, 2021b). The aim 
is to put in place appropriate strategies for the implementation of innovative and environmentally-
friendly investments and for the training and retraining of workers going hand in hand with the 
expected obsolescence of increasing shares of the old capital stock and the old professional 
qualifications. This requires innovative microeconomic and macroeconomic policies that foster 
high growth during the transition.
The last observation implies that the transition’s difficulties cannot be circumvented by weakening 
the environmental and technological objectives or by lengthening the implementation processes. 
As a recent analysis of the ECB has pointed out (see Alogoskoufis et al., 2021), these objectives are 
so binding, urgent and decisive for future generations that their achievement ensures economic 
and social benefits that, ex post, are more important than costs of the transition. However, 
differently from the assumptions shared by many macroeconomic textbooks, market adjustments 
are not instantaneous in the real world so that achieving new equilibria, characterised by a low 
environmental impact and by high innovation, takes time and cannot overlook the negative 
impacts of the transition. Hence, it is necessary to avoid that the latter negative impacts become 
unmanageable and prevent the completion of the transition processes even if the ex post costs 
of these processes are lower than the future expected benefits. NGEU and, in particular, the 
RRF and the associated NRRPs aim to make the costs and the other impacts of the transition 
manageable at least in the future five-year horizon (end of 2026).
13  The problems listed here are also taken seriously by those authors who do not share the view of technological pessimism, but – on the contrary – acknowl-
edge the potential long-term positive effects of technological change. One of the most interesting of such models has been developed by Acemoglu and Restrepo 
(2019). De Nardis and Parente (2021) have extended this model and applied it to the European case. 
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Given its leadership in terms of regulation and environmental economy as well as in terms of state 
intervention and welfare state, the EU has relative advantages in those areas over the USA and 
China. However, the EU itself is seriously lagging behind these two areas with regard to digital 
innovations and artificial intelligence. NGEU and RRF are designed with the aim of reabsorbing 
European weaknesses, also by strengthening the points of relative advantage specific to the 
EU. This ambitious objective should be reflected in the implementation of those technological 
trajectories in telecommunications, digital and artificial intelligence that combine in effective and 
efficient ways with ecological standards and social inclusion.  
If NGEU and RRF succeed in achieving these results, the European institutions will be able not 
only to improve the EU’s position in international markets but also to carve out an active role 
of the area in the construction of a new international economic governance. This active role 
can be defined as a “non-neutral economic mediation” in the technological conflict between 
the USA and China. European economic mediation would open up new prospects for the US 
environmental and social ambitions; and, without betraying the EU’s historic membership of 
the Atlantic Alliance, it would be able to remove the European economy from its technological 
dependence vis-à-vis the USA.14 At the same time, the EU and the euro area would be able to 
help the gradual reduction of certain Chinese economic and social distortions, avoiding direct 
competition with China’s own technological choices and mitigating the tensions in bilateral 
trade. This last step is crucial to point out that the US economy would not protect its medium to 
long term interest by asking to the European economy a trade decoupling towards the Chinese 
economy.15
If the EU were able to exploit its current positions of relative advantage and its opportunities in 
the post-pandemic world, it would exercise a “magnetic power” of attraction to other potential 
players in global economic governance. Indeed, many advanced countries and various developing 
areas look at the EU as a promising anchor to escape the stranglehold of the USA and China; the 
adoption of parts of the European model would provide a concrete tool to achieve such a result. 
Moreover, especially if under joint pressure from the remaining international areas, the USA and 
China would be positively conditioned by the EU agenda; and, as the recent initiatives taken 
by the Biden Administration indicate, this would strengthen efficient complementarity between 
state and market and the need for more effective regulation in an open international economy.
8. COHERENCE BETWEEN THE EU’S EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL AGENDAS
The previous analysis shows that a necessary condition for the EU to play an active role in building 
a new international economic governance is that its external agenda is supported by an internal 
agenda capable of ensuring – in the final equilibrium and during the transition – both an effective 
combination of green and digital investments, as well as the economic bases for innovative 
processes, productive reorganisations, rebalancing of the current account, retraining of workers 
and social cohesion. In her recent State of the Union address, the President of the Commission 
showed full awareness of the challenge and its difficulties (see von der Leyen, 2021).
The qualitative variables, which underlie Figure 3 (sustainability and degree of technological 
leadership) and which have been quantified by means of the indicators in Figure 4 and Table 1, 
provide the framework for the European policies in order to successfully pursue the EU’s external 
14  We acknowledge that the term ‘mediation’ may appear provocative, since it could suggest an equidistance of the UE with respect to the USA and China. 
To dispel this concern and re-affirm that the EU fully belongs to the ‘liberal capitalism’ (see above), we add two qualifications: non-neutral and economic. The latter 
qualification means that, even if from inside the Atlantic Alliance, the euro area’s economy cannot be decoupled from the Chinese one in the same interest of the 
USA.
15  Let us add that this decoupling would be economically unfeasible without a disruption of crucial international value chains that would have prohibitive 
costs for all the economic advanced areas.
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agenda and thus have the opportunity of positively influencing the USA and China: catching 
up the technological delay (vertical axis) and improving sustainability, especially economic one 
(horizontal axis). The same figures and the problems of the transition, highlighted by recent work 
(see, for example, the above mentioned: Lenaerts et al., 2021; Pisani-Ferry, 2021), illustrate the 
need for appropriate microeconomic and macroeconomic policies to achieve growth in the EU 
economy based on the most ambitious environmental objective ever set by an advanced economy, 
and simultaneous to recover the significant delays in skills adapted to these environmental and 
technological objectives.
What is required to achieve these results is a ‘vertical’ coordination between an EU fiscal policy 
and national fiscal policies (see Buti and Messori, 2021). The cornerstone of this coordination 
is NGEU, and in particular its most important programme, the RRF. The related NRRPs of each 
of the EU countries provide an institutional framework and the adequate financial resources for 
the implementation of projects centred on reforms, public investment and private investment 
in environmental sustainability, digital innovations, labour supply and social inclusion. In this 
regard, it is important to recall that the RRF ‘Guidelines’ require that the total resources of each 
NRRP are allocated at least 37% in green investments and at least 20% in innovative investments 
in the digital sector; in addition, the ‘Guidelines’ recommend that each member state allocates 
an adequate amount of resources to absorb the social imbalances induced by the shift towards 
environmental sustainability and the catching up of technological delays. In practice, most of the 
NRRPs submitted to date go beyond these minimum thresholds.
It can therefore be said that, at least for the duration of the NGEU (at present, end 2026), around 
two thirds of the funding linked to the new centralised European fiscal policy, which is triggered 
by the RRF, will be allocated to those components of the EU’s internal agenda that are essential 
to the success of its external agenda. Indeed, this share will aim at strengthening the EU’s 
comparative advantages or reduce its relative weaknesses at international level. In addition, in 
spring 2020, the European Commission launched the aforementioned SURE programme for euro 
area’s countries. Being in support of workers temporarily unemployed due to the economic fall 
out of the pandemic or helping short-time work arrangements, SURE has enriched the European 
tools for social inclusion and requalification of labour supply. Finally, in July 2021, the Commission 
proposed a climate package, Fit for 55, which goes beyond the NGEU time horizon and which 
also identifies potential tax revenues for strengthening ‘own resources’ in the European balance 
sheet (see European Commission, 2021a).
The external agenda, which aims at shaping an active role of the EU in the new international 
economic governance, has an unavoidable long-term horizon. Therefore, its foundations cannot 
be solid and the related European international economic proposal to the USA and China cannot 
be credible, if the internal agenda focuses on short-term challenges. This raises the issue of the 
future of NGEU and the RRF beyond 2026. However, any discussion on this is premature and 
raises problems that are not trivial, both from a legal and institutional point of view.
9. CONCLUSIONS
To use an image popularised by Robert Kagan almost twenty years ago, Europe will in the future 
continue “to come from Venus” (Kagan, 2004). In a world increasingly dominated by a logic of 
power entailing zero-sum games, this may be seen as a fatal weakness. Our paper argues that 
this is not an inevitable outcome. Under certain conditions, positive-sum games can still prevail. 
The EU and the euro area have important strengths, given the rising international concerns about 
environmental, social and economic sustainability. Although the obstacles remain formidable 
(see Papacostantinou and Pisani-Ferry, 2021), mending such fault lines can become a new “global 
endeavour”. 
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A realistic European objective for a reformed global economic governance cannot be to restore 
the imperfect economic multilateralism that existed before the international financial crisis of 2007-
2009 and which survived until the mid-2010s of this century. This does not exclude multilateral 
deals in important fields. Indeed, as is well exemplified by the global agreement reached on the 
taxation of major multinational companies, in the post-pandemic phase, the US and Chinese 
governments are willing to agree on compromise solutions in specific economic areas of mutual 
convenience. Yet, technological conflict for economic dominance over the frontiers of innovation 
between the USA and China is bound to last. This conflict risks relegating the EU to a marginal 
position in international markets. In spite of the serious delays accumulated by the European 
economy in digital innovation and artificial intelligence, the EU retains significant positions in 
more mature technologies. Coupled with large and persistent current account surpluses, this 
may give the false perception of a strong competitive capacity. However, especially in a situation 
of bilateral conflicts, persistent trade surpluses with the rest of the world are not a factor strength, 
but an element of vulnerability (‘reverse creditor paradox’, as dubbed in Buti and Tomasi, 2018). 
In this debate, some have pointed to the risk of the EU being relegated to a role as a spectator in 
the conflict for research and application of the technologies of the future.  We argue that such an 
outcome can be avoided. The growing technological conflict between the USA and China does 
not erase the fact that, in post-pandemic economy, the EU has significant opportunities. The new 
‘vertical’ integration between national and EU fiscal policies, made possible by NGEU and other 
European Commission initiatives, will help tackle existing weaknesses by conveying sizeable 
resources to policies aiming at fostering the green and digital transition. This provides the EU 
with the tools to reduce its technological dependency and play up its strengths in the conflict 
between the USA and China. In this respect, the EU needs to exploit the complex synergies 
between digital innovations and the environmental transition. In the last part of this paper (see 
sections 7 and 8), it has been explained why this transition is complex, especially in the short to 
medium term. NGEU and other EU programmes may find applications and extensions that can 
solve or circumvent such difficulties.
The new international economic governance, which the EU could influence if it were able to 
effectively reconcile its internal and external agenda, would not overcome the technological 
conflict between the USA and China or lead to a mixture of the ‘unbridled capitalism’ of the 
USA and China’s ‘political capitalism’. The EU would obviously remain anchored in the Atlantic 
tradition. However, in the global economic relations, EU would offer a model tempering the 
rough edges of US capitalism by placing greater emphasis to both the green transition and social 
cohesion; and it would point the way for the evolution of Chinese capitalism, by improving the 
environmental standard and the internal income distribution. 
This new international economic governance would not lead to a stable equilibrium. Rather, it would 
generate a sequence of what Hicks (1965) called “temporary equilibria”. The implementation 
of these equilibria offers, from time to time, dominant solutions to the “bad equilibria” that 
would be produced by a lack of economic management of the bilateral conflict between the 
USA and China. Hence, the proposed EU role as “non-neutral economic mediator” is betting 
on sustainable growth, in its various facets, becoming a new “global common” and hence help 
attain such temporary equilibria. Winning such bet is far from evident. There is nonetheless little 
alternative. The global future as well as the well-being of European citizens depend on it.
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